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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
HAZEL WOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v.
KUHLMEIER: HAS THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE SHUT ON
THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS?
The freedom of speech and the freedom of the press were both
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights' and have been considered essen-
'See U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... " Id.
The first amendment has been held to apply to the states under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment which prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST'. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g.,
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n.10 (1983) (first amendment principles applied to
state under fourteenth amendment due process clause); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324 (1937) (fourteenth amendment due process clause prohibits states from abridging
freedom of expression); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of press is
fundamental personal liberty and thus protected by due process clause against state action).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrTrUIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1978) (first amendment freedoms
have been "selectively absorbed" into the fourteenth amendment); Gibson, The Supreme
Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 267 (1986)
(first amendment "incorporated" into due process clause).
Justice Cardozo, writing for the court in Palko, said that the freedom of the press secured
by the first amendment has been applied to the states under the fourteenth amendment
because without this freedom "neither liberty nor justice would exist." Palko, 302 U.S. at
326. However, it was not until 1925 that the Court explicitly incorporated the first amend-
ment into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666
(as "fundamental personal right," freedom of speech and press protected by fourteenth
amendment from impairment by states). The Court in Gitlow explicitly disregarded earlier
statements by the Supreme Court that the first amendment freedoms did not restrict the
states. Id. For the earlier, contrary view, see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530,
543 (1922). See also Gibson, supra, at 267. See generally L. TRIBE, supra, § 11-2 (reviews
process of "selective incorporation").
The original intent of the Framers in drafting the free press clause of the first amend-
ment has caused a lively debate among commentators. Compare Anderson, The Origins of the
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tial elements in a democratic society." These freedoms, however,
have not been absolute,8 as courts have held that some types of
Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 455, 493 (1983) (Framers intended to grant widespread
guarantees of free press to create additional check on three branches of Government); with
Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177, 204 (1984) (freedom of
press only intended by Framers to prohibit prior restraint of press, not against punishment
for subsequent publication of "offensive" writings). Professor Chafee has expressed the
mainstream view that "The First Amendment was written by men . . . who intended to
wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of gov-
ernment, without any incitement to law-breaking forever impossible in the United States of
America." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941). See generally JEFFREY
A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM (1988) (overview of early history of press freedom).
2 See Palko, 302 U.S. at 327. Of the freedom of speech, Justice Cardozo wrote "[o]f that
freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom." Id. Similarly, of the freedom of the press, the Court has empha-
sized the "vital importance of protecting this essential liberty from every sort of infringe-
ment." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), the Court upheld the defendants' con-
victions for violating the Espionage Act, stating that their anti-war leafletting had intended
to "provoke and to encourage resistance to the United States . Id. at 624. In one of
his most famous dissents, Justice Holmes wrote:
But when Men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.
Id. at 630. But see Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech or Freedom of Thuggery in War-
Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL L. REV. 539 (1920). Professor Wigmore, in criticizing Justice
Holmes' theory of the "marketplace of ideas", wrote that it didn't recognize that "the
'power of the thought' of these circulars might 'get itself accepted in the competition of
the market', by munitions workers, so as to lose the war. . . 'the ultimate good' .. . would
be too 'ultimate' to have any practical value for a defeated America." Id. at 550-51. The
"marketplace of ideas" theory has also been criticized as being conducive to the ascen-
dancy of dangerous, yet accepted ideas. See A. BIcEtl, THE MORALrY OF CONSENT 72
(1975). Professor Bickel queried whether under the "marketplace" theory if "in the long
run the belief, let us say, in genocide is destined to be accepted . . . the only meaning of
free speech is that it should be given its chance and have its way." Id. See generally R.
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS, THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH
(1987) (historical background of Abrams case).
' See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-256 (1952) (certain classes of speech
can be prevented and punished); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) ("[C]ertain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.") d.
Justice Holmes wrote that "[tihe most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also LOCKHART, KAMISAR. CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, THE AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTION 414 (6th ed. 1986) ("Laws forbidding speech ... are commonplace");
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11 (some speech given
lesser degree of constitutional protection); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute,
1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 258. According to Meiklejohn, "[W]e must recognize that there
are many forms of communication which, since they are not being used as activities of
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expression" merit a greater degree of constitutional protection"
governing, are wholly outside the scope of the First Amendment." Id. But see Black, The
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1960) (first amendment withdraws from gov-
ernment power to restrict any type of speech). Justice Black was a proponent of an absolu-
tist interpretation of the first amendment. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("First Amendment's unequivocal command . . .
shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be
done in this field .... ").
The Court has held that time, place and manner restrictions on speech are permissible if
they "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve
a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (reasonable "time, place and manner" speech restrictions may be
permissible); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (government can regulate overampli-
fled loudspeakers). See generally T. EMERSON, infra note 4, at 328-45 (1970) (classifies "rea-
sonable" regulations); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 12-2 (distinguishes content-based regula-
tion from reasonable time, place, manner restrictions).
4 See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 12-7 ("[M]uch conduct is expressive, a fact the Court
has had no trouble recognizing in a wide variety of circumstances."). The first amendment
freedoms of speech and press have been held to protect a wide range of "expression." See,
e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (overnight
sleeping in park protesting plight of homeless "expressive conduct protected to some ex-
tent by the First Amendment"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (hanging
flag from window protected activity); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing of armband as protest protected "pure
speech"); cf T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970) ("To some
extent expression and action are always mingled .... "). See generally Nimmer, The Meaning
of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29 (1973) (review of ap-
proaches towards symbolic speech). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968) (not all expressive conduct is protected "speech"); W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FuTURI OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 186-87 (1976). Berns writes that "expression"
deserves less protection than "speech" because, of the two, only "speech" is "connected to
rationality, and it is man's rationality that makes him, unlike other animals, a being capable
of governing himself." Id.
* See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (first amendment permits "absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press"
with very narrow exceptions); Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (freedom to publish without prior
restraint "vitally important" to liberty); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (first
amendment freedom of press gave "principally, although not exclusively, immunity from
previous restraints or censorship"). See also Levy, supra note 1, at 204 (Framers meant only
to prohibit prior restraint, not subsequent punishment); A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 61
(while subsequent punishment for publication "chills" free speech, prior restraint "freezes"
it).
Notwithstanding the particular classes of speech that have been given greater constitu-
tional protection, government regulation aimed at a message's content have ordinarily
been held to be presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content .... "); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24 (1971) (conviction for wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft" in courthouse
unconstitutionally aimed at message's content); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269-70 (1964) (government cannot restrict message because of its content). See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 12-2 (distinguishes regulation of speech for its content and
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than others.6
Although it is not a right explicitly granted by the United States
Constitution 7 a sound education has been recognized by both
courts8 and commentators as crucial for meaningful citizenship
regulation of speech mainly to prevent evil unconnected with its content); Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190-97 (1983) (reviews
content-based/content-neutral distinction). Governmental regulation of speech based on its
content has been reviewed by the court with strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (state law barring utility company from
inserting literature with bills sustained only if "precisely drawn means of serving a compel-
ling state interest"); Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 (regulation prohibiting speech
for content given strict scrutiny); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209
(1975) (same). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 12.2 (same).
6 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (libel and slander
not always constitutionally protected); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (in-
citement to violence not constitutionally protected); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
481 (1957) (obscenity not protected). See generally E. ROME & W. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 5-6 (1985) ("certain categories of speech are wholly unprotected
by the First Amendment"); Kalven, supra note 3, at II (some speech has little social utility
and is not constitutionally protected).
I See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("Public education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution"). But cf Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (education is not merely
government benefit). See generally D. FELLMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND EDUCATION xi (3d
ed. 1976) (no constitutional authority given to federal government over education);
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 777, 814 (1985) (same).
The United States Constitution does provide, however, that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Thus, the constitutions of
forty-eight of the fifty states provide for public education. See Ratner, supra at 814; The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 111 n.44 (1973) (same). New York's consti-
tution, for example, states that the "legislature shall provide for the maintenance and sup-
port of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated." N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (McKinney 1987).
The omission of education from the powers explicitly granted to the federal government
by the constitution does not indicate a lack of interest in it by early American leaders. John
Adams wrote to the other Founders that, in forming a state, they should recognize that
"education makes a greater difference between man and man, than nature has made be-
tween man and brute . . . The virtues and powers to which men may be trained, by early
education and constant discipline, are truly sublime and astonishing." John Adams, quoted
in G. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT 73 (1983). See generally D. FELLMAN, supra, at XI-
XXII (overview of development of education in United States).
' See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognized that a state may
compel children of certain age to obtain schooling). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 214 (1972) (state cannot compel Amish children to attend school after eighth grade if
it violates free exercise clause of first amendment); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (requiring
children to attend public schools interfered with parent's liberty right to raise children
under due process clause). See also Levin, infra note 9, at 1651 (Pierce strikes balance be-
tween state's power to compel and regulate schooling of children and freedom of parents
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and the continued viability of a free culture.' Traditionally, edu-
cation in primary and secondary schools has been marked by the
transmission of social values and control of the students.1" The
academic environment in colleges and universities, on the other
hand, has been described as "peculiarly the marketplace of
ideas."1 In either case, courts have been reluctant to interfere in
to choose). See generally Gregory, Teaching Moral Values in Public Schools, 31 CATH. LAW
173, 177 (1987). (Pierce "forcefully repudiated the virulent anti-Catholic attempt to eradi-
cate Catholic elementary and secondary schools .... ").
I See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) ("public education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BAstc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (education has
"fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221
("[E]ducation is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in
our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence"); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (schools as a
"most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government");
G. WILL, supra note 7, at 73 (central symbol of American quest for constant improvement
is "little red schoolhouse"); Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Au-
thority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L. J. 1647-48 (1986) (education
transmits "society's common values and beliefs to the next generation, including those es-
sential to participation in a democracy"); cf Ratner, supra note 7, at 783-84 (high degree
of complexity in both workplace and military requires high level of public education).
10 See Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3159 (role of public high school is to inculcate fundamental
values); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (high school educators have "sub-
stantial interest ... in maintaining discipline. . ."); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("elementary and secondary schools are inculcative in
nature"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Education in
any meaningful sense includes ... inculcation"); Diamond, The First Amendment and Public
Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 499-500 (1981) (grade
schools and high schools have traditionally stressed value inculcation). See generally Levin,
supra note 9, at 1647-54 (examines tension between constitutional rights and the need for
inculcation of students); Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational Ide-
ology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 952-54 (1987) (notes inculcative nature of primary schools).
However, educators have not had a totally free reign in their attempts to inculcate youth
with moral values. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-65 (schools interest in transmitting values lim-
ited by students' rights under first amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (same); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (educators cannot "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .. "); Yudof, When Governments Speak.
Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 888-
91 (1979) (Pierce limits government's power to inculcate values). See generally Van Geel, The
Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV.
197, 203 (argues that education of young should not involve infringement of their constitu-
tional rights).
" Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See supra note 2 (discus-
sion of "marketplace" theory of free speech); Diamond, supra note 10, at 498
("[U]niversity-level education may require freedom to examine all issues and views in order
to arrive at the truth, grade schools and high schools .. .indoctrinate .... "). See also E.
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the decisions of professional educators because of the unique na-
ture of education."' There has often been a tension between the
inculcatory nature of primary and secondary school education and
the rights of public school students to free expression under the
first amendment."'
Recently, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier," this tension
was evident. The United States Supreme Court held in a 5 to 3
decision that educators in public schools can constitutionally exer-
cise editorial control over the style and content of a wide range of
school-sponsored student expression if that expression is inconsis-
tent with their school's "basic educational mission.""1
In Kuhlmeier, the respondents were three former high school
students at Hazelwood East who had been staff members of Spec-
trum, the school's newspaper."' Spectrum was written and edited by
a journalism class as part of the school's curriculum.17 It was the
BOYER, COLLEGE THE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 5 (1987) (university is where
"traditions can be challenged and new ideas tested"); Note, supra note 10, at 952-54 (dis-
tinguishes between inculcation of students in primary schools and the academic freedom in
higher education which is the marketplace of ideas).
12 See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (educators can "defend their claim of absolute discre-
tion in matters of curriculum ...."); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (courts lack "specialized" knowledge to make educational policy); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Courts do not and cannot intervene... in the
daily operation of the school systems ...."); Department of Education Organization Act,
20 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (Supp. 1987) ("[I]ntention of the Congress ... to protect the rights of
State and local governments... in the areas of educational policies ...."). See generally M.
MCCARTHY & N. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS
82-3 (2d ed. 1987) ("Supreme Court has recognized the broad discretionary authority of
school boards"); Diamond, supra note 10, at 507-10 (outlines benefits of local control of
public schools). But see E. BoLmsiERt, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE § 4.5, at 73
(federal judiciary exerts "powerful force" over public schools).
" See Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164 ("[flreedom to advocate unpopular and controversial
views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing inter-
est in teaching students ...."); Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (first amendment rights of students
must be considered in light of school setting); Levin, supra note 9, at 1649 ("[T]he very
nature of the process of inculcating values in those who are not yet adults.., necessitates
that the constitutional rights .. .of students be .. .circumscribed."). But cf. Kamenshine,
The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1134
(1979) (because there are no "uniformly acceptable" political values, schools cannot incul-
cate such values). See generally J. BRYSON & E. DErry, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CENSORSHIP OF
PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (1982) (overview of censorship
practices in public schools).
4 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
Id. at 567 (quoting Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986)).
" Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 565.
7 Id. at 565, 568-69.
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school's practice to have the principal review the page proofs for
each issue of the newspaper before its publication.18 Pursuant to
this procedure, the school's principal reviewed the page proofs for
the May 13th edition prior to its publication and disapproved of
two articles.19 One article described the experiences of three of
the school's students with pregnancy and the other contained the
accounts of students whose parents had been divorced.20 The
story on pregnancy was objected to by the principal because he
felt that the article's references to the student's sexuality and
methods of birth control were inappropriate for the school's
younger students and that the pregnant students might be identifi-
able.2 ' The principal objected to the article on divorce because it
named a student who complained about her father and did not
allow the parent to respond or consent to the publication. 2 Since
the principal believed that there was no time to make the neces-
sary changes before the paper was to be printed, he refused to
authorize publication of the questionable articles.'3
The students subsequently commenced an action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against
the school district and various school officials, claiming that the
school's actions had violated their first amendment rights.2" The
district court held that there was no violation of the first amend-
ment.2 6 Furthermore, the court concluded that public school edu-
cators could place restraints on student expression in activities
that are an integral part of a school's educational function if the
10 Id. at 565, 568.
19 Id. at 565.
0 Id.
I /d. at 565, 571-72.
Id. at 566. The principal was unaware that the journalism teacher had deleted the
name of the student from the final version of the article. Id. The student interviewed for
the article on divorce had complained that her father had not spent enough time with the
family and was always arguing with family members. Id.
"I Id. at 566. The principal was concerned that any delay in publication would prevent
the paper from appearing before the end of the school year. Id.
'4 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985). Prior to
commencing a plenary action on constitutional grounds, the students had sought injunctive
relief. 596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1984). The court held that the plaintiffs' graduation
had rendered their claims for injunctive relief moot. Id. at 1427. However, the court stated
that the availability of nominative and punitive damages prevented the claims for damages
from being moot. Id.
" Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1467.
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decision had "a substantial and reasonable basis."' On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the students' first
amendment rights were violated.27 The court of appeals reasoned
that the paper was a public forum, precluding its censorship unless
it was "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with school work . . . or the rights of others." 8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari9 and re-
versed the court of appeals, holding that the petitioners had not
violated the first amendment.80 Writing for the Court, Justice
White stated that students in the public schools "do not 'shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.' , However, according to the Kuhlmeier
Court, public school educators could constitutionally regulate the
content of student speech in school-sponsored activities as long as
the action was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."2
Reasoning that different first amendment standards are applica-
ble in the unique school environment, 3 the majority concluded
that a public school could censor student speech that was inconsis-
Id. at 1466 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
The court concluded that the principal's concern over the privacy rights of the articles'
subjects and the appropriateness of the material were reasonable. Id. at 1450. The district
court found that Spectrum was, as the product of a faculty-controlled class, part of the
school's regular curriculum. Id. The court stressed the "control and final authority with
respect to almost every aspect of producing Spectrum, as well as the control or pre-publica-
tion review exercised by Hazelwood officials in the past." Id. at 1465-66. Because of this
control, the court found that the school had not created a public forum. Id.
795 F.2d 1368, 1378 (8th Cir. 1986).
Kuhimeier, 795 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)). The court conceded that the paper was a part of the
school's curriculum. Id. at 1373. The court stated, however, that Spectrum was a public
forum "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." Id. at 1372. Ap-
plying the Tinker standard, the court of appeals found that the articles could not have
caused a material disruption. Id. at 1375. The court interpreted the "rights of others"
prong of the Tinker test as meaning only such an invasion of those rights as to cause tort
liability for the school. Id. The court concluded that no such liability existed. Id. at 1376.
" 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 572 (1988).
Id. at 567 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
U Id. at 571. The Court stated that this standard is consistent with the "view that the
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials, and not of federal judges." Id.
U Id. at 567.
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tent with its "basic educational mission, '"" even though the gov-
ernment could not infringe upon similar speech in a non-educa-
tional environment.35 The Court chose not to decide whether the
same standards would apply to school-sponsored student expres-
sion at the college and university level."'
The Court also stated that the paper did not merit the higher
first amendment protection granted to a "public forum."," Justice
White reasoned that the school had not intended Spectrum to be
such a forum, but rather a part of the school's educational curric-
ulum under strict control."
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, argued that censorship of
student speech by educators is unconstitutional unless the speech
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
. .. "89 According to Justice Brennan, the school's action did not
meet this stricter scrutiny because the school's purpose was merely
to promote a particular viewpoint.' 0 In contrast to the majority's
position, the dissenters dismissed "mere incompatibility with the
school's pedagogical message" as insufficient justification for cen-
sorship of school speech under the first amendment."1
By deciding that censorship of school-sponsored activities would
be constitutional unless it had "no valid educational purpose,''14
" Id. (quoting Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986)).
" Id. The Court stated that any first amendment analysis must be "applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment." Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
506). See supra notes 5 and 6.
" See id. at 571 n.7. The Court did, however, base its decision concerning the reasona-
bleness of the principal's actions on the young age of some of the school's students. Id. at
571-72.
87 Id. at 569. The Court reasoned that the school had not "by policy or practice" shown
any intent to open the paper's pages for "indiscriminate use" by the students. Id. (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educs'. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983)).
", Id. at 569. The Court concluded that the paper was a "supervised learning experi-
ence" which the school could reasonably regulate as a part of the school's curriculum. Id.
9 Id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). Justice Brennan applied this Tinker standard and
found that the principal had not deleted the articles because he reasonably believed that
they would interfere with school discipline, but rather because he felt the material "inap-
propriate." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 578 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that "the state educator's
undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to teach moral and political values is not a gen-
eral warrant to act as 'thought-police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and
advocacy of all but the official position." Id. at 577 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 571.
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the Court in Kuhlmeier sought to reaffirm the principle that educa-
tional decisions should be within the province of professional edu-
cators and local school boards rather than the judiciary. 4" In do-
ing so, the Court was accurately reflecting the trend in both law
and society toward returning to traditional educational values." It
is submitted, therefore, that the Court correctly balanced the na-
ture of primary and secondary education against the first amenld-
ment rights of students. It is suggested, however, that censorship
of school-sponsored speech in institutions of higher learning
should be evaluated under stricter scrutiny because the "basic
educational mission"" of these schools has been the free ex-
change of ideas rather than inculcation." This Comment will first
relate the decision in Kuhlmeier to the increasing recognition by
the Court of the requirements of primary and secondary educa-
tion and then propose that a different first amendment standard
should apply in colleges and universities which, like the "market-
place of ideas", are akin to public forums.47
I. FROM Tinker TO Kuhlmeier - THE COURT RECOGNIZES THE
NATURE OF EDUCATION
The Court has frequently upheld actions by primary and sec-
ondary school officials that would have been deemed unconstitu-
tional outside the educational setting. 8 This different constitu-
43 See id. at 571. See also supra note 13.
" See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1988, at AI, col.1 ("The ruling ... continued a recent trend
in which the Court has taken a narrower view of the constitutional rights of public school
students .... "); N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1988 at 1, col.2 ("decision continues'a trend that gives
high school students lesser constitutional rights then adults.") See generally, Gregory, supra
note 8, at 173 (recent attention focused on developing "students' ability to make sound
moral judgments .. . is grounds for cautious optimism.").
48 Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988) (quoting Bethel
School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986)).
" See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
4' See infra note 64 (cases cited compare university to public forum).
41 See Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164 (although speech made by student was not obscene, in
school setting it no longer was constitutionally protected); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340 (1985) ("school setting requires some easing" of fourth amendment); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) ("The school child has little need for the protection of
the Eighth Amendment"); Diamond, supra note 10, at 497 ("public schools embody in all
their aspects the denial of first amendment rights"); Levin, supra note 9, at 1649 ("[t]he
very nature of the process of inculcating values . . . necessitates that the constitutional
rights of ... students be somewhat circumscribed"); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
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tional standard for these schools has been due to the high level of
discipline and expertise that education requires.4
In the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District,"0 the Supreme Court recognized the "special
characteristics of the school environment."'" Accordingly, the
Tinker Court acknowledged the first amendment rights of a stu-
dent while in school, but stated that educators could censor stu-
dent expression if it "materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involved
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.""3 It is
submitted that this constitutional standard impedes the efforts of
educators to effectively control the academic environment in their
schools because it only allows them to regulate student speech
under limited, extreme circumstances. 63
Schools are constantly choosing one opinion over another in
U.S. 726, 750 (1978) ("The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast mate-
rial . . . justiflies] special treatment of indecent broadcasting"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (banning sale of sexually oriented material to minors constitutional,
although the material was constitutionally protected for sale to adults); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults"). See generally Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx.
L. REV. 321 (1979) (discussion of differential treatment of children under Constitution).
"I See supro note 12 (discussion of Court's reluctance to question educational decisions).
See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of
the public school system . . . raises problems requiring care and restraint .... " (quoting
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)); cf. Note, Freedom of Expression in Public
Schools: Regulation of Student Newspapers and Other Publications, 18 CuMB. L. REv. 181, 202
(1987-88) (student should have burden of proof since acts of educators presumed
constitutional).
The need for discipline in public schools has recently received much attention. See Get-
ting Tough, TIME, February 1, 1988 at 52-58. One educator, New Jersey principal Joe
Clark, when discussing his educational philosophy stated: "Discipline is the ultimate tenet
of education. Discipline establishes the format, the environment for academic achievement
to occur." Id. at 52. Among Principal Clark's teaching tools is a 36 inch baseball bat. Id.
- 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" Id. at 506.
'Id.
83 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (importance of discipline to education). See
also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) ("local control over the educational
process... encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educa-
tional excellence'" (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1973))). On the importance of a high school principal being able to set the tone for his
individual school, William Kristol, chief of staff for Secretary of Education William Bennett
said: "He can set the general tone, the spirit, the ethos if you will, of the school. He can
give it a sense of order, enthusiasm for learning and high expectations." TIME, supra note
49, at 56.
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their choice of textbook, teachers and curriculum." This selection
of one viewpoint over another is both necessary and desirable in
primary and secondary schools." The Kuhlmeier Court recognized
this reality by distinguishing the speech in Tinker, expression by a
student that happens to occur on school grounds, from school-
sponsored student expression that is part of a school's
curriculum."
" See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) ("schools teach
tolerance... bounds of socially appropriate behaviour"); Board of Education v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (educators making decisions relating to
books and courses for students does not raise first amendment concerns); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (schools transmit "the values on which our society rests");
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (schools are "principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values . . ."); A. BL oM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND 26 (1987) (democratic education has "moral goal" of producing citizens with charac-
ter to support democratic system); Gregory, supra note 8, at 173 ("teaching students how
to make informed moral choice . .. an indispensable ingredient of any civilized society .
."1).
New York has also recognized that "education" goes beyond "reading, writing and arith-
metic" by prescribing courses to "foster in the children of the state moral and intellectual
qualities which are essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or
in war .... " N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 801 (McKinney 1987).
" See supra notes 9-10. See also Pico, 457 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("mem-
bers of a school board will act on the basis of their own personal or moral values .... ");
Zykan v. Warsaw Comm. School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[I1t is in
general permissible and appropriate for local boards to make educational decisions based
upon their personal social, political and moral views"). See generally Mieklejohn, The Recon-
ciliation of First Amendment Freedoms With Local Control Over the Moral Development of Minors,
12 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1978) (places issue of local control over values of youth in
context of federalism).
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 568-69 (1988). The Court dis-
tinguished Tinker, which had addressed the constitutional rights of a student who indepen-
dently wore a black armband as an anti-war statement, from speech that occurred in an
activity that "members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school" such as the school's newspaper. Id. at 569-70. The Court characterized speech
occurring in the latter situation as part of the school's curriculum as long as it is under
faculty supervision and as part of an activity intended to teach students and audiences. Id.
at 570. When speech is school-sponsored, according to the Court, a school should be able
to "disassociate itself' from it. Id. (quoting Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166). This action would
not be reviewed under the Tinker standard, but rather the educators' actions would only
have to be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 571. The Court
concluded that the principal had acted reasonably due to the nature of articles and the age
and maturity level of the student body. Id. at 571-72. Thus, according to the Court, the
censorship had a "valid educational purpose" and the students first amendment rights had
not been violated. Id.
Other courts while still applying the Tinker standard, have also considered the nature of
educating in primary and high schools. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d
858, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1982) (school had "substantial educational interest" in reviewing stu-
dents' articles for accuracy before publication); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519
(2d Cir. 1977) (in reviewing constitutionality of restriction of student expression, "it is not
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The Tinker Court reasoned that any choice of one value over
another by educators would "foster a homogeneous people"' , and
would amount to an unconstitutional prescribing of what is "or-
thodox" by a public official.58 It is submitted, however, that by
taking away control of a school's curriculum from educators and
local communities, while giving federal courts a greater say in the
educational process, the Tinker standard is itself prescribing such
an orthodoxy. Each community has its own educational stan-
dards.5 ' What is an acceptable educational standard in Mobile, Al-
abama is not necessarily so in New York City. These variations in
standards produce diversity rather than orthodoxy. By accepting
each school's subjective "basic educational mission "" as a factor
in determining whether there has been an infringement of stu-
dent's constitutional rights, the Kuhlmeier Court acknowledged the
importance of this diversity.
II. THE COLLEGE AS MARKETPLACE FOR IDEAS
The majority in Kuhlmeier explicitly declined to decide whether
the minimum scrutiny standard"1 it set down for the decisions of
educators in primary and secondary schools would also apply to
similar decisions made at the college and university level.42 Other
courts, however, have distinguished colleges and universities from
the function of the courts to reevaluate the wisdom of the actions of [educators]"). See also
Diamond, supra note 10, at 528 (critique of Tinker as not recognizing reality of education).
60 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (quoting
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
" See id. See also Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official ...
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion . . ."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (Constitution would be violated by curriculum that
encourages one way of thinking); Lazarus, Be Judges, Not Editors, NAT. L.J., Feb. 15, 1988,
at 13, col, I (judges should not wield the "constitution as an editor's blue pencil").
See supra note 12. See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (Court
recognizes "primacy of States in the field of education ...."); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (Court will not correct errors in exercise of discretion by local school
board members that do not violate Constitution); Diamond, supra note 10, at 506 ("na-
tional constitutional standard" set down in Tinker ignores local structure of education in
United States).
" Kuhmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567 (1988) (quoting Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct.
3159, 3166 (1986)).
' Id. at 569, 571.
USee id. at n.7. "We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and univer-
sity level." Id.
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the lower schools because of the different ages and maturity levels
of their respective students. 3
The freedom of speech of students in primary and secondary
schools has not been "coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings."" By contrast, the Court has held that the "First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual stan-
dard""6 between speech that occurs on a university campus and
speech in the community at large." Therefore, it is submitted
that decisions made by university and college educators relating to
student speech should be reviewed with the same scrutiny applied
to regulation of speech in "public forums.16 7 Under this standard
of review, educators in public institutions of higher learning
would have to demonstrate that a content-based regulation of stu-
dent speech is necessary to serve a "compelling state interest and
" See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) ("University students are.
• young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students .... ); Nicholson v.
Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (because of differences in age and
maturity, different first amendment standards apply between colleges and lower schools);
Zykan v. Warsaw Comm. School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) (high school
students lack "intellectual skills necessary for taking full advantage of the marketplace of
ideas..."); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1977)
(same); Wright, infra note 73, at 1053 (right of free expression varies between high school
and college because of difference in average age).
College aged individuals are treated as adults in other areas of the law such as marriage,
criminal penalties, formation of contracts and the voting age. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) (Black, J.) (Congress can lower minimum voting age to 18 for
national elections).
" Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164. See also supra note 48 (cases cited give less constitutional
rights to students and children); Stanley v. Northeast Indus. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960,
969 (5th Cir. 1972). "[T]he exercise of rights of expression in the high schools, whether by
students or by others, is subject to reasonable constraints more restrictive than those con-
straints that can normally limit First Amendment freedoms." Id. Huffman and Trauth,
High School Students, Publication Rights and Prior Restraint, 10 J. L. & EDuC. 485, 486 (1981)
(first amendment rights of students somewhat less than those of adults). cf. Emerson, To-
ward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 939 (1963) (regulation of
children's freedom of expression "need not conform" to same first amendment standards
applied to regulation of adult expression).
" Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973). In Papish, the Court held that
a state university could not constitutionally expel a student for distributing an "under-
ground" newspaper that contained a cartoon which depicted policemen raping the Statue
of Liberty and the word "motherfucker." Id. at 667-68.
" Id. at 670-71. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (rejects view that
"First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large"); Note, Restriction of the First Amendment in an Academic Environment,
22 U. KAN. L. REV. 597, 600 (1974) ("university's power to restrain obscenity or offensive
language on campus is no greater than the state's power to do so off campus").
" See infra note 70 (cases cited compare colleges to public forums).
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that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 8
The Supreme Court has stated that colleges and universities
"possess many of the characteristics of a traditional public fo-
rum"6 9 and has recognized the "intellectual give and take of cam-
pus life."70 Traditional public forums have been described as
"used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."'" Streets and parks have
exemplified "quintessential" public forums where speech is given
a great deal of protection. 72 Colleges and universities have, per-
haps on an even greater level than streets and parks, been public
forums where academic freedom has been encouraged." Educa-
"See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); cf Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (greater protection given to speech that takes place in
forums that have traditionally been used for expressive purposes). See generally Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965, Sup. CT. REV. 1, 21 (discussion of higher
burden of proof for regulating public forums). But see Farber & Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analy.: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.
L REV. 1219, 1234 (1984) ("Constitutional protection should depend not on labeling the
speaker's physical location ....").
0 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981)).
In Widmar, the Court found that a university "at least for its students" was comparable to a
traditional public forum. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5. However, it was also conceded that
a "university differs in significant respects from public forums." d. at 268 n.5.
10 Healy, 408 U.S. at 181-82.
" Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). In Perry, the Court
described traditional public forums as places "which by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Id. at 45. See also Airport Comm'rs of Los
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987) (same). See generally Stone, Fora
Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233 (reviews various views of speech
in public forums).
" See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (public streets and parks fall into category of traditional
public forums); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (same); Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (streets
and parks have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public"); Kalven, supra
note 68, at 21 (recognizes "right to the streets as a public forum").
7s See supra note 69 (discussion of court's frequent comparison of the university campus
to a public forum). See also Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rxv. 1027,
1040 (1969) (compares campus to parks in determining first amendment rights).
Courts have traditionally been deferential to the "academic freedom" that ideally exists
on college campuses. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5 (constitutional protection for in-
tellectual discourse on campus recognized, citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972)); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom .... ); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957). In Sweezy, a professor was investigated for refusing to answer questions
concerning an allegedly subversive lecture he delivered at the State University. Id. at 243.
In holding that the college professor's first amendment rights had been violated, the Court
placed academic freedom on the level of political expression, "areas in which government
should be extremely reticent to tread." Id. at 250. The Court stated that:
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tors in these public forums would, however, be able to make rea-
sonable "time, place and manner" regulations of speech."
Expression taking place in forums that the government has des-
ignated as public has also been given a high level of protection .7
In determining whether the government has intended to open a
non-traditional public forum to free public expression, the Court
has looked to the expressed policy as well as to the "nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity."" It is sug-
gested that universities have been compatible with such expressive
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost
self-evident .... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation . . . Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Id.
The Court has also held that a certain amount of federal aid to religiously sponsored
colleges did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment because while pre-
college church schools indoctrinate children with religious values, church colleges are
marked by a high level of academic freedom. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87
(citation omitted) (1971).
14 See Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. at 2571. "The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication." Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45); Cf.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (because of university's educational mis-
sion, Court has not denied its authority to impose "reasonable regulations"). See also L.
TRIBE, supra note I at 12-21 ("time, place, or manner restrictions" that do not serve signifi-
cant government interests are unconstitutional); T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 328-45 (clas-
sifies reasonable "time, place, or manner" regulations).
"' See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (ex-
pression occurring in forums designated by government for assembly and speech highly
protected); Perry Educ. Assn' v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (speech in
government designated public forums given protection identical to speech taking place in
traditional public forums); Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). Under
the first amendment, "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more contro-
versial views." Id. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. CMI. L. REV. 20, 28 (1975) ("[E]ssence of first amendment is its denial to government
of the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which suppressed.").
" Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Intrinsic to classifying whether a forum is one where the
content of speech cannot be easily regulated is the property's "character," even if it is not
traditionally a public forum. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). In
Grayned, the Court inquired "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. See, e.g., Southeast-
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (public theatre designed for
expressive activity); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (nature of library held
compatible with silent protest). See generally Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Fa-




activity and that, because they are testing places for new ideas, it
is in the best interest of states to designate them as public
forums.7
III. CONCLUSION
The university and the primary school have opposite roles in
the process of education. The Kuhlmeier Court recognized the in-
culcative role of the lower school by giving educators of the young
a great deal of latitude in controlling their students.78 By contrast,
courts should carefully scrutinize the regulation of expression in
universities where the "ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas .. .
Bennett R. Katz
" Sea supra note 11 (reviews nature of university as testing place for new ideas). The
turmoil of American campuses during the 1960s is an extreme example of the public na-
ture of college campuses. See generally Glazer, "Student Power" in Berkeley, in CONrOwrA-
TioN 1 (D. Bell and 1. Kristol eds. 1969); cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (free
expression facilitates political and social changes through peaceful means); Mosley, 408 U.S.
at 95-96 (free speech permits "the continued building of our politics and culture").
78 See supra notes 7-12. See also Diamond, supra note 10, at 500-01. Lower "schools act
as socializing institutions and as value inculcators of citizens both of which contradict the
intellectual free marketplace of ideas approach ... ." Id.
' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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